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Abstract
The pervasiveness of smartphones has made
connecting with users through proximity based mobile
social networks commonplace in today’s culture.
Many such networks connect users by matching them
based on shared interests. With ever-increasing
concern for privacy, users are wary of openly sharing
personal information with strangers. Several methods
have addressed this privacy concern such as
encryption and k-anonymity, but none address issues of
eliminating third party matches, achieving relevant
matches, and prohibiting malicious users from
inferring information based on their input into the
system. In this paper, we propose a matching scheme
that accurately pairs similar users while
simultaneously providing protection from malicious
users inferring information. Specifically, we match
users in a proximity-based social network setting
adapted from a framework of differential privacy. This
eliminates the need for third-party matching schemes,
allows for accurate matching, and ensures malicious
users will be unable to infer information from
matching results.

matching users in a PBSN is for an initiating party to
broadcast a user’s interests to the other nearby users
directly. These users then decide if a connection will
be made based on similarities between them and the
initiator. The result will either be a match, or no
match, based on some similarity computation.
Although this scheme is effective, unfortunately, it
sacrifices the privacy of the users. Users might not feel
comfortable broadcasting their interests if it is related
to sensitive matters. It is not hard to imagine a
scenario where a user maintains a personal persona
separate from their professional persona. Bad things
could happen if this user were matched with a fellow
employee who might reveal sensitive information
about the user in the workplace. Also, users may
experience loss of privacy if a malicious user
systematically changes their interests until a match is
made with another user. It allows the malicious user to
infer information about other users interests by simply
using the application how it is intended. Common
approaches of encryption and k-anonymity do not
successfully address preserving user privacy while
simultaneously producing accurate results.

1.1. Related Word

1. Introduction
The reliance on mobile devices is ever increasing in
our current culture. The pervasiveness of such devices
allows for such conveniences as Location Based
Services (LBSs). LBSs are mobile application services
that provide a service, such as a restaurant
recommendation, to a user based on their location.
Foursquare and Yelp are two widely known LBSs.
Social networking applications often utilize LBSs in
Proximity Based Social Networking (PBSN), which is
commonly used to match users based on similarities in
interests in things like music, sports, movies, etc.
Examples of PBSN’s are mobile dating applications
such as Tinder, and Sonar.me. A typical process for
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Various solutions have been proposed in recent
years [1,7,8,9,13,14] to address the issues of preserving
privacy while matching users. These solutions all
assume the user has multiple interests chosen from a
public set of defined interests. These interests range
from things like what type of music a person likes, to
how often do they consume alcohol.
[10] matches users by both the number of common
interests and the corresponding interest weight on each
of the individual users. They argue this allows for
more accurate fine-grained matches. Instead of peer to
peer sharing of data to find user matches, [10] relies on
a third-party matching scheme. The problem with this
reliance on a third-party is that they maintain a central
repository for all user data and therefore are subject to
a central point of failure if the third-party entity is
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somehow compromised.
[10] also relies on
computationally expensive encryption techniques that
do not address the issue of a malicious user inferring
other user information based on their interests and
match results.
[6] incorporates differential privacy by perturbing
data with noise from the Laplace distribution and using
secure multi-party computation (SMC) for matching.
They utilize a blocking step when processing the data
for SMC. This filters out records that will not be part
of the join result and ensures the cost of matching
during SMC will be at acceptable levels. Instead of
using common k-anonymity techniques to sanitize the
data, they leverage differential privacy. Essentially,
they group records according to their attributes and
then use noise drawn from the Laplacian distribution to
either suppress a record or add a fake record. If the
noise is positive they add fake records to the dataset,
and if it is negative they suppress records from the
dataset. Their experimental analysis aims at reducing
the cost of private matching records. Although they
show their approach provides strong privacy
guarantees, their effectiveness in reducing matching
costs is approximately the same as the k-anonymity
versions.
The approach in [6] essentially uses the noise from
the Laplacian distribution as a binary decision to add or
suppress data. This is fundamentally different from
our approach. We add noise from the Laplace
distribution to all attributes of a given record. The
experimental results of [6] also focus on reducing the
cost of SMC so it is unclear as to how accurate their
matching results are.
[7] develops an approach to publish search queries
and click data in the form of a click query graph. A
query is only published if the query frequency plus
some added noise exceeds some threshold. Their
findings are that the more stringent the privacy
requirement, the higher the threshold, and
consequently the fewer the number of queries that can
be safely published. Their approach is similar to [6] in
the way they information is released based on some
threshold. Our research differs in the way we use
Laplacian noise with data. We don not suppress data
based on some threshold as [7] does. It is also unclear
if the approach in [7] relies on third parties. The
experimental analysis of [7] found that keywords
obtained with the perturbed data closely resemble the
original unperturbed data. Whether this translates to a
more general case of matching users is unclear.
[8] avoids the issues with third party matching by
directly calculating matches between two users based
on a maximal intersection of interest sets where
interest is defined as a string up to a certain length.
Calculations are computed locally on each user’s

machine. It is unclear how accurate the matches
between users is with this approach, and no data is
provided regarding accuracy. Also, the set matching
technique in [8] does not address the issue of malicious
users inferring information because when one user
attempts to match with another, they can infer interests
of the other from the matching results.
[13] uses three different protocols to match users in
PBSN’s. These protocols assume an honest but
curious user and do not address the scenario of a
malicious user who changes input and observes output
to infer information of another user. The paper states
that if a malicious user Bob repeatedly tries to match
with a user Alice by creating fake profiles, he can
eventually learn Alice’s profile information. To
combat this problem, they suggest limiting the number
of times that Bob can attempt to match to Alice.
Unfortunately, this suggestion is not an adequate
solution to the problem our paper focuses on; ensuring
that user profile information is safe from malicious
users. Although [13] provides adequate protocols for
an honest but curious scenario, they do not address the
problems that are the focus of our paper.
[14] matches users with similarity calculations
based on prioritizing and weighting individual
interests. This is done without the use of a third party
matching scheme, but a malicious user can still infer
knowledge by repeatedly querying nearby users and
analyzing results. Again the accuracy of matches is
not thoroughly examined in this research.
The problem of secure matching discussed in this
paper is similar to secure recommender systems.
Cryptographic solutions to the problem of secure
recommender systems such as [5,6] focus on removing
the third-party recommenders. They do not attempt to
limit the amount of knowledge malicious users can
infer through using the system as intended.
[9] develops a differentially private recommender
system that provides guarantees of privacy for users.
Their system ensures some level of privacy against
malicious users inferring information from the use of
systems that recommend movies from the Netflix
dataset. The approach in this work is developed for a
specific recommender system that uses certain
statistical steps. This approach does not generalize to
all recommenders and therefore does not work for our
research. Technical differences between our work are
in the way we use the interest weight of a user as the
count query function where they compute a covariance
matrix. Lastly, the general objective of the research in
[9] is different from ours. [9] uses statistical methods
to aggregate user data and recommend movies where
our work involves mutual selection between two
parties by focusing on user to user matching, not an
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aggregation of some number of user records to
recommend something to a given user.
[11] develops a lightweight recommender system
that uses perturbed data for existing recommender
systems. Data is perturbed locally and their system
works with existing recommenders. Perturbing the
data locally ensures their objective of privacy
preservation is met and allows their data to be used
with third party recommenders. Their experimental
analysis shows that recommendation accuracy is
preserved while perturbing the data. Our research
differs in the general objective. Similar to the
differences with [9], [11] focuses on recommending
products to a user based on aggregating some number
of user records to find the most relevant product. It is
unclear how this approach would generalize to our
objective of finding the best match from direct user to
user matching.
A common approach to preserving privacy in data
is anonymization. This involves methods such as kanonymity.
K-anonymity typically attempts to
anonymize data with two techniques: suppression and
generalization. Suppression involves removing or
masking certain attributes in the dataset and
generalization involves replacing individual values of
attributes with a general range. The problem with
these approaches as shown in [1] is that the
anonymization techniques often used render the data
useless for matching algorithms. Differential privacy
does not experience this problem.

Users privacy will be guaranteed up to some ,
meaning no user will be able to definitively infer each
interest level of another user. The similarity between
two users is calculated with the Pearson coefficient
similarity metric, a common similarity metric used in
matching algorithms.

1.1. Contributions

2.2. Differential Privacy

The contributions of this work are to implement a
matching algorithm to be used for PBSN’s that
provides differential privacy guarantees for the users.
The challenge of this task is to provide accurate
matching while maintaining privacy. This challenge is
overcome by developing a matching algorithm within
the framework of differential privacy. The issue of
using a third-party matching scheme is arbitrarily
solved by calculating the matching metrics for users
directly on their devices. Furthermore, third-party
matching schemes could be used as long as the data
they received was already differentially private. The
issue of malicious users inferring user information
from the results of the algorithm is addressed by
applying differentially private techniques to user’s
interest data. Specifically, perturbing the data using
random noise drawn from the Laplace distribution.
Applying the Laplace mechanism to each user’s
interest data set ensures that a malicious user will not
be able to determine a user’s interests and that
subsequent queries will also not leak information.

Differential privacy formalizes the idea that the
output of some computation does not allow inference
to be made on the presence or absence of any record in
the computations input. More formally, it requires that
for any outcome of a randomized computation, that
outcome should be nearly equally likely with and
without any one record [9]. A randomized computation
M satisfies -differential privacy if for any adjacent
dataset X and Y, and any subset S of possible
outcomes Range(M),

2. Preliminaries
2.1. Dataset and Distance
In this research, a dataset x is a collection of
interests from the universe U of all possible interests.
When a given user does not have an interest in a
particular attribute, the interest will remain in the
dataset with a weight of 0. Our universe U of interests
is U = {interesti, …interestn} where i = 1 … n and n is
the total number of possible interests. Given this
definition, we can define the distance between two
datasets x, y with the l1 norm as [3]:

The dataset used for our experiments consists of
weight vectors of user interests. Weights for interests
range from 0-5 where 0 indicates no preference (no
interest) and 5 indicates strong preference. An attribute
in the dataset is an individual weight for a user interest.

The guarantee differential privacy provides can be
interpreted as a bound on the ability to infer from any
output event S, whether the input to the computation
was X or Y [3]. In our project, this means inference
about the presence or absence of any given attribute
(user interest) is bounded by a factor of
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It is important to note that differential privacy is a
property used in our algorithm that outputs matches. It
is not the output itself. Differential privacy is a privacy
guarantee for some defined .

input until a match is made with a targeted user, or
information is inferred about the user. In this scheme,
any given user can act as the malicious user.

3. Problem Description
2.3. Laplace Mechanism
The Laplace Mechanism is used to ensure
differential privacy with our matches. This works by
perturbing a counting query
with noise distributed
according to a Laplace distribution centered at 0 with
scale

,
Lap(x| ) =

then the Laplace mechanism is defined as:
where Z is a random variable
drawn from the Laplace distribution. The Laplace
Mechanism is proven to ensure differential privacy [3].
In our work, the counting query function is simply
the preference count for a given interest. Similar to
counting a population of people represented in a
dataset that smoke, the preference count represents the
number of bits that represent the amount of interest a
user has in a specific area.

2.4. Similarity Metrics and Matching
Matching in our work is where for a given user
Alice from a set of N users, a similarity metric is
calculated for the N-1 users and the user with the
highest similarity score to Alice is the one she is
matched with. Each user has a set of interests
represented as a weight vector and inputted into the
Lapalce mechanism. The output of the Laplace
mechanism from one user to the rest is used to
compute the Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC),
which computes the similarity between two users.
PCC in this instance shows the linear relationship
between two weight vectors. PCC output ranges
between -1 and 1 where a value greater than 1 would
be a positive relationship for the vectors, a value less
than 0 would be a negative relationship, and a value of
0 would be no relationship at all.

2.5. Adversary Models
A common user scheme for this type of research is
to consider the user honest-but-curious [10][3][8].
This research addresses the honest-but-curious user
approach as well as the malicious user approach. This
malicious user has the power to modify interest weight

The protocol in our approach is a PBSN that
involves n users geographically close, who are trying
to match with each other based on shared interests.
This protocol does not rely on interacting with a third
party matching entity. The process is divided into two
phases: creating differentially private user datasets, and
matching users. An example assumes n users where
each user has their own preference dataset Ip = <Ip1, Ip2.
…, Ipn>. The PBSN application ensures each users
dataset is differentially private. Each user dataset is
then shared with all n-1 users and the similarity is
computed. The most similar user to a given user Alice
is the one matched to Alice. This can also be
generalized to the most similar k users, where k can
equal 1 to n-1.

3.1. Phase I
In this phase, the Laplace mechanism is applied to a
given user’s preference dataset. This is done locally on
each user’s machine. This eliminates the need for a
third-party matching system as well as sharing
unperturbed data with other users. The Laplace
mechanism adds random noise to each interest count
drawn from the Laplace distribution. Once the Laplace
mechanism outputs the perturbed dataset, it can be
shared with all other n-1 users.

3.2. Phase II
In this phase, a user calculates their matching
similarity with all n-1 users. This is done by
calculating the PCC for a given user amongst all other
users with their provided perturbed dataset. The user
with the highest similarity to a user Alice will be the
one she is matched with.
Since the datasets used in the matching satisfy
differential privacy for some , Alice cannot determine
definitively the exact interests and weights that
achieved this match. Furthermore, each user can
control the privacy they are comfortable with by
adjusting the noise metric used in their differential
privacy calculation.

4. Experiments
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The experiments in this paper consist of
simulations of PBSNs that pair similar users. The
simulations are implemented in Python and the dataset
used is a real world dataset pertaining to the interests,
habits fears, and opinions of young people between
the ages of 15 and 30 in Slovakia. The responses to
each question are in the form of a scale where 0
denotes no interest and 5 denotes a strong interest [16].
There are a total of 1010 participants and a total of
140 attributes for each respondent. Three experiments
are performed to analyze the trade-off in accuracy vs
privacy, as well as validate accuracy and usefulness of
our system. Experiment 1 calculates the number of
features vs the matching accuracy for different
amounts of noise ( ) drawn from the Laplace
distribution. Experiment 2 computes the best match
for one sample with an of 0. The placement of this
best match in similarity lists (list of highest scoring
matches to lowest scoring, for a given amount of noise)
of various is compared. Experiment 3 computes the
match for multiple values of . The rank of these
matches on a baseline similarity list is compared.

4.1. Experiment 1
Experiment 1 compares the trade-off between
accuracy and privacy ( ) with various feature sizes.
Here, features represent the weight vectors of users
interests. For each , we compute the best match with
10, 50, 90, and 130 features. A random sample is
drawn from the dataset to compute the PCC against all
other samples. The values for that we compare are
0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9. The baseline that we
compare all others to is = 0 which means no noise is
added to the data. For the baseline, as the number of
features included in the similarity calculation increases,
the similarity score decreases. After computing the
baseline for the various feature sizes, we then generate
a similarity score between all users, for all values of .
For each , we now have a list of similarity scores
between all the samples and the randomly chosen one.
From here, we use the highest scoring calculation from
each feature size in the baseline and find it in the
similarity lists for each . This allows us to compare
the accuracy of the baseline match and the different
amount of privacy applied to the system. The results
of this are displayed in Figure 1.

4.2. Experiment 2

In this experiment, we compute the PCC for one
randomly chosen sample against all other samples in
our dataset. Our baseline used for comparison is when
= 0. Like before, we obtain lists of similarity scores
by computing PCC between the random sample and all
others for = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9. We do this for
feature sizes of 10 to 140, where the feature size
increases by 10 each time. This results in a total of 14
features sizes. We next compare the highest scoring
match in the baseline at each feature size to the
similarity lists for each
size. Specifically, we
calculate where the baseline match sits in the similarity
list for each , and we store this in a matrix. From
here, we can compute the average distance of how far
away a value for places the baseline match across all
feature sizes. The results of this are displayed in figure
2.

4.3. Experiment 3
Experiment 3 computes the PCC for one randomly
chosen sample against all other samples in our dataset.
Our baseline used for comparison is once again when
= 0. In this experiment we compute a similarity list for
the baseline. We then compute the highest scoring
match for each value of
across all feature sizes
(feature sizes are the same as experiment 2). After this,
we check to see where the highest scoring match for
each value of rank in the baseline similarity list. We
essentially reverse the comparison done in experiment
2. Results of experiment 3 are found in figure 3.

5. Experimental Evaluation
The general findings of our experiments show that
although there is a trade-off between accuracy and
privacy when matching users, our system matches
users with high similarity even with significant noise
added to the data

5.1. Experiment 1 Evaluation
The results of experiment 1 reveal multiple
findings. In general, figure 1 shows that as a number
of features used in calculating similarity increases, the
similarity scores decrease. It is obvious that when the
feature set is more robust there will be less similarity
between users, because there are more features to
consider, resulting in a decrease in score. This holds
true whether or not noise is added to the data.
The most important finding from experiment 1 is
that as the noise added to the data increases, the
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accuracy of the matching algorithm decreases, but not
significantly for
 0.5. This has been noted in
previous research [9] and is now displayed in our novel
approach.
Our system maintains relatively high
matching accuracy even with significant noise added to
the data
The takeaway from this experiment is that PBSN’s
are capable of overcoming the challenge of not
allowing malicious users to infer information thus
preserving user privacy in matching algorithms.
Figure 1 shows that depending on the data for a
particular PBSN; consideration is required to find the
right balance between a number of features used for
calculating similarity, the amount of noise to add to the
data, and how much variation in accuracy to allow in
the system.

similarity. This means that although our system might
not match the true highest scoring match, it matches on
one of the top six. Even on our relatively small dataset
of approximately 1000 users, the top ten closest
matches were always within a similarity score with a
range of no more than 10%.
The impact of this finding is great for PBSN’s. It
ensures that even if a differentially private system does
not match a user to the user with the highest similarity
score, it will be one of the top six. When more features
are used to calculate the similarity between two users,
similarity scores decrease. This means that the reality
of a perfect match is more difficult to achieve.
Because of this, our system works as well (for  0.5)
as a system with no noise added. For practical
purposes in industry, our system is acceptable.

Fig. 1. Each line represents some  of
privacy.
The comparison of privacy vs
accuracy is compared to various sizes of
features used in computing similarity between
two samples. The red line has no noise
added, and serves as the comparison for all
others.

Fig. 2. This illustrates the distance for the
nearest neighbor in the baseline to the various
. Each column is the average distance
across all feature sizes.

5.2. Experiment 2 Evaluation
Results from experiment 1 show that striking the
right balance between feature size and privacy can
allow our system to still perform highly accurate
matching. Experiment 2 looks at the accuracy from a
different perspective and aids in validating the findings
from Experiment 1.
Results of experiment 2 show that for  0.5, the
baseline highest scoring match for a given feature size
is less than six users away from the top of the
similarity lists for each
on average. This is a
significant finding because it shows that adding noise
up to 0.5 keeps the relative order for the k closest
matches intact and still matches users with high

5.3. Experiment 3 Evaluation
Results from experiment 3 reinforce findings in
experiments 1 and 2. Here, we look at where the
highest scoring matches for various rank in the
baseline similarity list.
The general results of experiment 3 show that the
highest scoring matches for all  0.5 are one of the
top 26 matches in the baseline similarity list. Figure 3
shows that for the highest scoring matches for  0.5,
these matches are in the list of the top six matches for
the baseline. This further shows that not only does the
datasets with added noise (  0.5) keep the highest
scoring matches for the baseline among their top six
matches, the highest scoring matches resulting from
the perturbed dataset are amongst the top six matches
in the baseline.
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The findings in this experiment show that the
although the matches made with the noisy datasets
might not be the absolute best match, they are one of
the top six for  0.5. This means that on average, our
system will match a user with one of the top six most
similar users for an
 0.5 across all feature sizes.
This illustrates the practicality of our system for
industry use.

For matching systems used in industry, it is
typically not required that the best match be made,
rather, a match between two users with high similarity.
We have demonstrated that our system performs well
in this setting. We generally match users to one of their
top six most similar neighbors while adding noise to
the data. Our system does not rely third party matching
schemes and allows users to set the privacy level they
are comfortable with.
Directions for future work include expanding our
system to work with other data sets and testing
different matching protocols. Also, fully realizing our
system by implementing it in an application that can be
tested on mobile devices in a real world setting.
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